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ABSTRACT 
The paper documents substantial improvements in the living standards of labourers over the 
past 30 years in villages in the Tiruppur region, a dynamic centre of garment production in 
western Tamil Nadu. The improvements have been associated with state programmes and 
policies relating to education, subsidised food, transport and communications, et al., and the 
growth of rural industrialisation centred on knitwear production for export and domestic 
markets. There are still very few opportunities for the majority to move into employment 
other than low skilled manual labour however. This raises questions about the strategy based 
on ‘cheap labour’ that the Indian state has been pursuing in the recent period. Alternative 
strategies would almost certainly serve the interests of labour better than this.  
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1.  Introduction 
This paper looks at the way in which terms and conditions of employment have 
combined with strong state social policy to improve the position of labour in an 
industrialising region of South India. Social policy is defined broadly here to include social 
welfare as well as education, health, and employment generation policies. It has come onto 
the agenda for developing countries with the rise of neo-liberalism, and its ‘freeing up of 
labour markets’, encouragement of ‘flexible labour markets’, et al. India was one of a number 
of countries that expanded its social policy initiatives as part of its neo-liberal project in the 
1990s and early 2000s.1 The expansion of social policy could be seen as necessary to contain 
resistance to neo-liberal policies. Social policy could also be seen as transferring some of the 
responsibility for the provision for the reproduction of labour from capital to the state.2 This 
was a project that some fractions of capital would support. At the same time however, social 
policy strengthened the bargaining position of labour vis a vis capital. This made it a project 
that labour would support as well.  
This paper looks at a case in southern India in which there is clear evidence of 
expanded social policy initiatives at the state and national level strengthening the position 
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and bargaining power of labour in the 1990s and 2000s. Improved terms and conditions of 
employment and expanded state social policy had combined to produce very substantially 
improved standards of living for the labourer population between 1981/2 and 2008/9. It is 
only in comparison with what were very poor standards in 1981/2 that this looks impressive 
though. Overall, policy was supporting an economy continuing to rely on large quantities of 
relatively unskilled labour.  
The context is one driven by dynamic industrial growth linked to the global market, 
part of the neo-liberal project in which India has been involved over the past 3 decades or so. 
The paper looks at how some of this played out at the local level in a particular case. The 
case in question is the expansion of the production of knitwear for export, in a relatively 
decentralised and labour-intensive industry dominated by small-scale production units 
centred on Tiruppur in western Tamil Nadu. The strong social policies that accompanied 
the expansion of the knitwear industry pre-dated the introduction of neo-liberal policies, 
originating as they did in the 1960s. They were strengthened in the 1980s, and strengthened 
further after that as well. These strong social policies were driven by the populist politics for 
which the state of Tamil Nadu has long been well known. 
The paper uses data from a study of villages in the vicinity of Tiruppur between 
1981/2 and 1996, and between 1996 and 2008/9. In doing so, it follows a tradition of using 
village studies as a basis for discussing issues that are much wider than those arising in the 
villages alone.3 The immediate focus of the paper is on the indirect effects of industrial 
growth on agricultural labourers the large and increasing majority of whom were Dalits. 
Dalits represented a larger proportion of the population resident in the villages in 2008/9 
than in 1981/2 (Table 1). They represented a larger proportion still of agricultural labourers.  
The paper is based on fieldwork spanning the period from 1981/2 to 2011. The first period 
of fieldwork, in 1981/2, pre-dated the growth of knitwear production for export, and the 
strong social policies which accompanied this. By the time of the second period of fieldwork, 
in 1996, the effects of the expansion of knitwear production were being felt in the villages, 
and the effects of social policies were beginning to be seen. By 2008/9, knitwear had become 
a major feature of the local landscape; likewise social policy. The paper traces the effects of 
these developments on labour. It focuses particularly on labour that continued to be 
employed in agriculture, an overwhelming proportion of which was Dalit by 2008/9. The 
terms and conditions of employment in agriculture tracked those in industry for much of the 
period under review.  
The paper starts with a brief introduction to the region, and the study villages. It 
then sets out terms and conditions of employment on the one hand, and social policy on the 
other, in 1981/2, 1996, and 2008/9. This is followed by a discussion of the interactions 
between social policy and industrialisation and the effect that these had on the position of 
labour. The paper ends with a concluding section. 
 
 
2.  The Region, the Villages and the Data 
The study villages are part of the Coimbatore region in western Tamil Nadu, the 
early industrialisation of which centred on Coimbatore. Industrialisation was linked with 
agriculture in the 1920s and 1930s, both through textiles which depended on cotton, and 
through engineering which produced pumpsets for agriculture as well as textile machinery. 
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Industrial entrepreneurs came from the dominant agricultural castes. Dominant agricultural 
castes also provided much of the industrial labour. Dalits were in the minority as industrial 
labourers in the region as a whole.4 The industrial sector diversified over time, incorporating 
light industries of all kinds, but textiles and engineering remained dominant. Agriculture, 
already relatively highly commercialised and capital intensive in the 1930s,5 also played an 
important role. There was a further spurt of intensification of agriculture in the 1950s and 
1960s with the electrification of lift irrigation and increasing levels of use of purchased 
inputs. The combination of relatively high levels of industrialisation with a relatively 
commercialised agriculture defined the development of the Coimbatore region for much of 
the 20th century.  
(i) The first systematic survey on which this paper relies was conducted in 1981/2, 
before the expansion of the knitwear industry. Coimbatore was already relatively 
industrialised, much of its industry consisting of large and medium-scale textile and 
engineering units clustered in and around Coimbatore. It was not easy for people from the 
study villages to get access to employment in these units in 1981/2. The study villages were 
relatively ‘remote’ at the time, i.e. not on a main road. 6 The bulk of village employment was 
in agriculture. The remainder was in trade and services derivative of agriculture. The villages 
were dominated by an oligarchy of ‘thottam farmers’7 making up 12-13 percent of the 
household population, with holdings averaging 7 acres, some well-irrigated, some dry. These 
were not large farmers, but they were farmers operating intensive systems of production and 
making relatively good profits from doing so. Gounders were the most numerous of the 
landholders in the study villages in 1981/2. Naidus were much less numerous but also had 
significant landholdings. Chettiars, who were strongly represented in trade as well, were the 
other major landholding group.8 The other caste groups represented in large numbers were 
two Dalit labourer groups, Chakkiliyars and Pannadis.9 A variety of other caste groups were 
represented in smaller numbers.  
In 1981/2, land was irrigated exclusively by deep open wells with bores, the deepest 
of which went down to 200ft. Cotton, sugarcane and turmeric were the major well-irrigated 
crops, supplemented by groundnuts, bananas, tobacco, coconut, tapioca, chillies, mulberry, 
paddy, cholam, ragi, cumbu and a variety of other cereals, vegetables and fruits. Cholam, 
groundnuts, gingelly and a variety of pulses were grown on dry land. There was also a 
substantial livestock economy. There was relatively little mechanisation of field operations. 
There were only 2 tractors in the villages in 1981/2. The system relied on large numbers of 
labourers working throughout most of the year.  
The state played a strong role in 1981/2 providing agricultural research and 
extension, veterinary services, credit, et al. There were also food for work programmes on a 
limited scale. The state also had a presence in education, and a much less strong presence 
with respect to health. There were no health centres in the villages in 1981/2.  
(ii) The next systematic survey was conducted in 1996.10 By then the production of 
knitwear for export had taken off in Tiruppur and Tiruppur was growing faster than 
Coimbatore. Knitwear exports had grown from an estimated 10m pieces in 1984 to 257m 
pieces in 1996, and from an estimated value of Rs.10 crores in 1984 to Rs.1892 crores in 
1996 (Singh and Sapra 2007). These are conservative estimates. Not only were exports not 
all captured here. Production for the local market was growing alongside that for export as 
well. It is difficult to estimate the numbers employed in the industry but it was probably well 
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over 100,000 already in 1996, and included migrants as well as local people. Tiruppur was 
the focus of attention in discussions of employment opportunities in the villages in 1996, 
and of much else too. Large numbers of individuals resident in the villages, the large majority 
non-Dalits, were commuting to work in Tiruppur and other nearby towns and urban 
centres. Only some were commuting to knitwear units though. They were also commuting 
to work in spinning, weaving, engineering, metalworking and a whole host of other non-
agricultural activities. Much of the industrial growth was small scale and decentralised. 
Industrial units were also being set up in the villages and surrounding rural areas. The 
development of transport and communications, which had improved enormously since 
1981/2, was crucial to all this. Agriculture was doing much less well in 1996. One of the 
main reasons for this was the rise in labour costs, with the growing competition from 
industry and other non-agricultural activities. Relatively fewer Dalits were moving out of 
agricultural labour than non-Dalits, but the exodus of non-Dalit agricultural labourers meant 
that employers had to pay Dalit as well as non-Dalit agricultural labourers more. Another 
reason for agriculture doing less well in 1996 was a decline in the water table which had been 
seriously depleted by the intensification of agriculture. Agriculture was also getting less 
support from the state.11  
Agriculture was now relying on borewells which were gradually replacing open wells, 
the deepest going down to 600ft. Irrigation technology had become more expensive and it 
was producing less water than before. Though there were now 4-5 tractors in the villages, 
bullocks were still widely used. There was more irrigated cotton, a relatively labour-intensive 
crop, despite the growing shortage of labour. There were also more bananas. There was less 
rain-fed cultivation than there had been in 1981/2. The mix of minor crops grown on 
irrigated land had changed too. Fodder shortages limited the role of dairy production but it 
was playing a bigger role than in 1981/2. 
The state had expanded its role significantly with respect to social policy (see below). 
Its support for production had been decreasing though.  
(iii) Brief periods of fieldwork in 2003 and 2004 were followed by a new survey in 
2008/9.12 Knitwear production had expanded further. Exports had grown from an estimated 
$5.4K in 1996 to $2.5bn in 2008/9. There were now an estimated 400,000 people or more 
working in the industry, about 60percent of whom were migrants (Dorairaj 2010). The 
knitwear industry, producing for the domestic as well as the export market, was having a very 
significant effect on the villages in 2008/9, an effect that was strongly caste-differentiated 
too. There had been more outmigration, and some inmigration which was new.13 There was 
only a small increase in industrial units in and around the villages. There had been 
substantial real estate development. There had also been a proliferation of financial services.  
There had been a marked decline in agriculture in the villages by 2008/9.14 Much less 
land was being cultivated than in 1996. Water was now being tapped from as deep as 1200ft. 
More tractors and other motorised vehicles were being used for transport, and for field 
operations. There were far fewer bullocks than in 1996. There was very little cotton left, and 
much less sugarcane. There were more bananas and turmeric. Among the minor crops that 
were being grown was maize, which was one of the sources of feed for poultry units that had 
emerged on a number of farms too. Agricultural employment had not fallen very much 
however because agricultural labourers from the villages were now working over a much 
wider geographical area than before. 
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There had been significant further expansion of state welfare programmes including 
the NREGS (National Rural Employment Generation Scheme) which was just getting off 
the ground in 2008/9. These were having noticeable effects both on standards of living and 
on the bargaining power of labour. The caste and gender segmentation of the labour markets 
in these villages produced effects that differed significantly between the different segments. 
The NREGS increased the bargaining power of Dalit female labour, for example. Other state 
welfare programmes increased the bargaining power of Dalit male and female labour. There 
were also noticeable effects on non-Dalit labour. These are elaborated further below.  
Brief return visits in 2010 and 2011 showed a substantial expansion in the uptake of 
the NREGS, and some new initiatives, including the spread of drip irrigation, in agriculture. 
Broadly, however, these visits confirmed trends already evident in 2008/9. 
With this background we now look at (a) terms and conditions of employment, and 
(b) social policy and social welfare, in 1981/2, 1996 and 2008/9.  
 
 
3. Terms and Conditions of Employment, Social Policy and Social Welfare: 
1981/2, 1996 and 2008/9  
 
(i) TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN 1981/2  
In 1981/2, most of the working population in the villages was employed in 
agriculture, or in trade and services derivative of agriculture. There were three types of 
agricultural employees: pannayals, or bonded labourers, employed on an annual basis;15 
casual labourers employed on a daily basis; and sugar cane crushers working on contract 
outside the villages as well as within for 6-10 months in the year, staying away for months at 
a time. Pannayals were all male and nearly all Chakkiliyars. Casual labourers were male and 
female and from all caste groups. Sugar cane crushers were all men, the majority Pannadis. 
Table 2 shows the numbers of males involved in each of these different types of agricultural 
employment.16  
A relatively small number of people were employed outside agriculture in 1981/2, 
most of them in trade and services, a few in larger scale manufacturing units outside the 
villages. Table 3 shows these numbers in 1981/2.  
Pannayals were employed by thottam farmers who were sophisticated agriculturalists, 
managing relatively capital intensive enterprises, operating in a variety of different markets, 
and keeping up with the latest seeds and other plant varieties, agronomic practices, et al. 
They employed 1-5 pannayals each in 1981/2. They also employed substantial quantities of 
casual labour on a daily basis. 
 Relations between pannayals and their employers were extremely oppressive in 
1981/2.17 Pannayals were beck and call labourers working long hours. They were required to 
stay on the farm at night to look after livestock, equipment, and stores, if their employer did 
not live on the farm. They also did a substantial amount of night irrigation work. Boys 
started working as pannayals when they were 10 years old, or younger, first for their keep, 
gradually more as they grew up. The annual earnings of adult pannayals doing the full range 
of tasks were considerably higher than those of casual labourers.18 There were discretionary 
benefits which included time off, loans and ‘help’ with expenditure on health care, life-cycle 
ceremonies, et al. Discretionary benefits were key instruments of control which pannayals 
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resisted by doing things like buying produce in the local markets instead of from their 
employers and getting loans from elsewhere.  
 Thottam farmers used large numbers of casual labourers for particular operations. 
Small farmers employed smaller numbers likewise. The standard hours for casual labourers 
were 9-6 in 1981/2. Some worked from 6-9 in the early morning as well. They got food at 
work if their employer did not want them to go off in the middle of the day. There was 
employment more or less round the year. Seasonal unemployment was not a major issue at 
the time. Moreover there were Dalits who had moved to these villages when a house became 
available because they knew that these were villages in which it was always possible to get 
work. There were problems in years of severe drought however. Then people went 
considerable distances to seek work to tide them over until employment in the villages 
became available again. There were families for whom droughts had been occasions to 
migrate permanently too. 
Sugar cane crushing was done by groups on a contract basis. It involved working 
long hours in poor conditions, staying on the farm where the sugar was being crushed, 
earning somewhat more than pannayals. Much of what was earned was spent on the job 
however. Sugar cane crushers’ wives complained about how little money they brought home. 
Sugar cane crushers responded that the work was so hard that they had to drink much of 
what they had earned to be able to continue to do the job. 
 
 
(ii) SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN 1981/2  
Social policy is defined here to include state interventions which protect those in 
employment and others in the population as a whole. It includes social welfare interventions 
such as the provision of subsidised food and other essential commodities; the provision of 
housing and amenities associated with housing; the provision of health care; and pensions, 
maternity, accident and disability benefits. Support for education was an important 
component of social policy rather than social welfare. Employment generation schemes and 
schemes to support self-employment fall under social policy here too.   
There was only a limited amount of recognisable social welfare reaching the villages 
in 1981/2. Not much of it was reaching Dalit labourers and their families. This was one of 
the reasons that labourers were so dependent on employers at the time. Most of the strong 
social welfare interventions for which Tamil Nadu is known only reached the villages in the 
later 1980s and subsequently. In 1981/2 there were intermittent food for work programmes 
on which manual labourers but rarely Dalits were employed. There were also the beginnings 
of what were to become major Dalit housing developments. New Dalit colonies were in the 
process of being set up in 2 of the 4 hamlets in the study villages in which there were 
substantial Dalit communities in 1981/2. The initiatives for these new Dalit colonies came 
from thottam farmers who were able to mobilise state support. This was partly a strategy on 
their part to capture and immobilise Dalit labour. Apart from housing, social protection was 
still very much a matter for non-Dalits in 1981/2.  
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(iii) TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN 1996  
In 1996 there were nearly as many paid employees in non-agricultural employment 
as in agricultural (Tables 2 and 3). There were relatively few Dalits among the non-
agricultural employees though. The increase in non-agricultural employment was the result 
of the integration of the villages into the wider local economy and the growing industrial 
development that had taken place since 1981/2. The non-agricultural employment was 
primarily in textile mills and engineering workshops as well as knitwear. There was relatively 
little paid employment in trade and services. There were relatively few government 
employees in the sample too.  
The majority of employees in the industrial sector were in relatively unskilled jobs, 
many though not all of these jobs providing more regular employment than agriculture. 
Hours were longer however, and commuting added to what was already a long working day. 
For the majority industrial employment was not significantly better than agricultural. The 
generally lower social status associated agricultural labour did not appear to be a major factor 
here.  
Pannayal employment was still widespread in 1996 though less so than in 1981/2 
(Table 2); casual labour remained the dominant form of employment in agriculture; contract 
labour (not distinguished from casual labour in Table 2) was now being used for tasks other 
than sugar cane crushing; and more people from the villages were now involved in sugar cane 
crushing too. There was less child labour in 1996 than there had been in 1981/2.  
 Thottam farmers were doing less well in 1996 than they had been in 1981/2. 
Irrigation had become more expensive and was producing less water than it had in 1981/2. 
Increased labour costs were also a problem for those employing labour, but these had not 
resulted in much mechanisation, at least as far as field operations were concerned. 
Mechanisation was still a relatively expensive alternative to labour. There had been changes 
in cropping patterns but these were more evident in relation to minor than to major crops. 
Thottam farmers were less dominant in the villages. They were moving into the wider 
industrial economy, many still retaining their homes in the villages, others moving out. They 
were educating their sons to enable them to move into the wider economy as well. Thottam 
farmers were nothing like as buoyant or confident in 1996 as they had been in 1981/2. 
 Pannayals were no longer beck and call labourers. They had fixed hours of work, 
similar to those of casual labourers; and they had fixed holidays negotiated at the beginning 
of the year. It was no longer easy for employers to get pannayals to stay overnight on their 
farms. Employers complained that state provision of TV in the colonies meant that 
pannayals would no longer work long hours either. Employers also complained that 
pannayals taken on at the beginning of the year often left without completing their contracts, 
and that it was no longer possible to get Chakkiliyar elders to bring them back. Pannayal pay 
had increased substantially. Adult pannayals were being paid nearly twice as much in real 
terms in 1996 as they had been paid in 1981/2.19 There were fewer boys working as 
pannayals, and fewer young men. Relations between pannayals and their employers were 
much less oppressive too. 
Terms and conditions of casual labour had also improved. Hours were shorter. And 
pay had nearly tripled. The wages of casual labour had increased much more substantially 
than those of pannayals.20 Seasonality was more of an issue in 1996 however than it had been 
in 1981/2, as crop patterns had changed and there was less irrigation than before.  
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Contract labour was now being used for many tasks, not just for sugar cane crushing. 
Many men preferred contract to casual labour because they could earn more working for 
fewer hours that way. There was also more sugar cane crushing work in 1996, most of it 
outside the villages, and women were involved as well as men. The majority of sugar cane 
crushers were Pannadis, as in 1981/2. 
Thus, there had been a considerable improvement in terms and conditions of labour 
in agriculture as agriculture competed with the better terms and conditions available in non-
agricultural employment in 1996. This could be attributed at least in part to the integration 
of the village economy into what was a dynamic local economy driven by the expansion of 
knitwear production for export that had been so striking in and around Tiruppur. It could 
also be attributed to the expansion of social policy. It was not just improvements in 
employment conditions that improved the position of labour. Social policy was also 
contributing very significantly, both directly and indirectly, in 1996. 
 
 
(iv)  SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN 1996  
A substantial number of new social policy and social welfare programmes were in 
place in 1996. Earlier programmes had also been expanded. Some of the more important 
social welfare programmes as far as labourers in the villages were concerned were the PDS 
(Public Distribution System); the ICDS (Integrated Child Development Services); free 
school meals, school uniforms and books; pensions, and maternity, accident, and disability 
benefits; and housing developments. There had also been a significant expansion of 
education and some improvement in health coverage though there was still no health centre 
in the villages. The IRDP (Integrated Rural Development Programme) had been continuing 
as had intermittent employment generation schemes. Programmes to support production 
were not expanding though. 
The PDS was a flagship programme21 providing subsidised food and essential 
commodities including rice, sugar, some wheat products, and kerosene, and an annual 
distribution of saris and dhoties. Whereas in 1981/2 the PDS had had a very low profile, 
having only relatively recently been extended to the rural areas, in 1996 it was playing a 
significant role. Not all households were able to access it successfully. Dalits had more 
difficulties than others in doing so. There were problems with the reliability, and the quality, 
of supplies.  But it was reaching large numbers in 1996.22 
The ICDS supplemented the PDS, providing food for pregnant women and young 
children. It also provided child care for small numbers of pre-school children, primarily 
Dalit, whose mothers went out to work.    
Free school meals, uniforms and books, introduced in 1984, were generally regarded 
as having had a significant impact on participation in education in Tamil Nadu.23 
Participation in education had increased very substantially in the villages between 1981/2 
and 1996.24 There had been a substantial reduction in child labour in Dalit households 
between 1981/2 and 1996 too.  
Pensions and maternity, accident and disability benefits were only reaching some of 
their intended beneficiaries in the villages in 1996,25  but the fact that they were available was 
significant nevertheless.    
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Dalit housing had improved enormously between 1981/2 and 1996 in two of the 
four study villages in which there were Dalit communities. The colonies being established in 
1981/2 were up and running, doubling the number of house sites and houses and providing 
more public space as well. Similar extensions were being planned for the other two Dalit 
communities. Dalits were spending more on buying house sites, and building and extending 
houses with or without contributions from the state. This had led to increases in 
indebtedness, to moneylenders, to employers, and to the state. 
There were a number of credit programmes providing loans for small-scale self-
employment in the 1980s and first half of 1990s.26 The majority of investments financed by 
such programmes in these villages were livestock investments, mainly but not exclusively 
non-Dalit. There were also employment generation schemes, but these were not very visible 
in the study villages in 1996.  
Overall, this amounted to a significant expansion in state social policy reaching low-
income households, reducing their dependence on employers and the village elite. This 
reinforced the impact of integration into the rapidly growing industrial economy that was 
also playing a role in reducing dependency in the villages. 
Dominant caste employers complained that social welfare developments were 
undermining their position. They attributed Dalit labourers’ unwillingness to work as much, 
or as hard, or for as long, to the ‘pampering’ they were getting from the government. 
Employers also attributed the increased assertiveness of labour to ‘Tiruppur’, the local 
shorthand for the expansion of the knitwear industry. Labourers, both Dalit and non-Dalit, 
also felt that the fact that there were now alternatives available to them in the knitwear 
industry and related sectors meant that they could resist pressure from employers in 
agriculture much more strongly than they had been able to before. The balance had clearly 
shifted in favour of labourers for other reasons too. These included changing attitudes on the 
part of state officials particularly where Dalits were concerned.27 There were also wider social 
influences at work through TV and other media as well as heightened geographical mobility. 
 
 
(v)  TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN 2008/9  
Paid employment outside agriculture had overtaken that in agriculture for the 
villages as a whole by 2008/9 (Table 3). This was not the case for Dalits though. Also 
striking was that, unlike in 1996, manufacturing employment was now dominated by 
employment in the knitwear industry. There had been an increase in employment in 
miscellaneous trade and services as well, much of it associated with transport and other 
activities related to the knitwear industry.  
The majority of people resident in the villages who were employed in the knitwear 
industry were in relatively unskilled jobs. These included tailors who had learned the job by 
working as ‘helpers’ for a year or more. This was not strictly speaking ‘unskilled’ 
employment. It was however employment that was easily accessible to manual labourers of 
all caste groups if they started young enough. People from the study villages were employed 
in knitwear production for the domestic market as much as for export, and this was more 
regular than export production.28 But although much of this employment was more regular 
than agricultural labour, hours were long and pay was not very different. Most of the people 
who worked in the knitwear industry were young, male and female, Dalit as well as non-
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Dalit.29 They were attracted by what they regarded as relatively ‘light’ work, and work that 
was relatively social. They also liked getting out of the villages. There were few prospects of 
advance for these employees though. They were likely to continue in relatively unskilled low-
paid positions for as long as they continued to work in the knitwear industry. 
There had been only a small decrease in the overall numbers of agricultural labourers 
in the villages in 2008/9 (Table 2). The decrease for non-Dalits was greater than for Dalits 
though. Pannayal labour had virtually disappeared in 2008/9. There was no more child 
labour in agriculture either. Contract labour was now the dominant form of male 
agricultural employment. Women also did contract labour, but not as much as men. People 
employed on contract worked outside the villages as well as within. None of them was doing 
sugar cane crushing work though. Sugarcane was now being processed in mills.  
Contract labour was organised informally. Non-Dalits were not involved because 
they were not prepared to join Dalit groups and there were too few of them to make up 
groups consisting of non-Dalits alone. Contract labour was organised by someone hearing 
about the work who would get a group together. Pay was better if the work was further away. 
If far away the employer would send a truck to pick the labourers up, and they would often 
stay for several days to complete the work. Employers in the villages complained that men 
were rarely willing to do casual labour in 2008/9. Daily wages for male casual labourers 
varied between Rs.100/- and Rs.150/- for a 6-hour day. If they worked on contract they 
could get up to Rs.200/- or Rs.250/- per day in the villages, and more if they worked further 
away. Women were also doing contract labour in the villages but they did more casual than 
contract labour. Daily wages had only increased in real terms by a little more than 20 percent 
since 1996. This was much less than the increase between 1981/2 and 1996. If one compares 
what men were getting on a daily basis in 1996, however, with what they were getting on a 
contract basis in 2008/9, the increase is nearer 35 percent  
It was clear that there was not enough work in the villages for the agricultural 
labourers who lived there in 2008/9. However employers in the villages had to compete with 
employment available elsewhere in agriculture as well as employment available outside of 
agriculture. A significant number of Dalits were working outside agriculture in 2008/9. 
Agricultural labourers’ discourse included the fact that there was not enough work in the 
villages, which was why they had to go outside for work. However, it paid, and they could 
get enough work if they went further away. These were people, mainly Dalits, who did not 
want to work in factories, or in construction, et al. They did not like working in urban areas 
either. Many of them felt that agricultural labour was as good as any other work that they 
could get.  
The bargaining power of labour of all caste groups was clearly stronger in 2008/9 
than it had been in 1996, or 1981/2. It was enough to keep pay in agriculture more or less 
on a par with industry, and to ensure reasonable relations with employers too.30 There was a 
whole discourse on the part of employers regarding the fact that they felt they had to treat 
their labourers really carefully if they were to get them to come to work.31 Pay may have 
increased year by year, but this alone was not enough. 
It was not only competition for labour from industrial and other non-agricultural 
activities that had strengthened the position of labour. It was also the expansion of social 
policy and social welfare. We turn to this now. 
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(vi)  SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN 2008/9  
Further developments in social policy included a substantial expansion of the PDS. 
School meals had also improved and their uptake had increased. There were more pensions, 
and maternity, accident and disability benefits reaching Dalit households. There had been 
significant further improvements in Dalit housing. Education had improved too, as had 
health care – there was now a health centre in one of the study villages. There was less 
support for small scale self-employment and what there was now channelled through SHGs 
(Self Help Groups). Earlier employment generation schemes had been replaced by the 
NREGS. This was a new initiative with major long term implications that was getting off the 
ground in the villages in 2008/9.  
Dalit households were getting a substantial proportion of their rice through the PDS 
in 2008/9. They were getting a range of other foodstuffs, and other commodities, as well.32 
The price of PDS rice was reduced in 2006, from Rs.3/50 to Rs.2/50, and then Rs.2/00, and 
finally, in September 2008, Rs.1/00 per kg., by the DMK government which was elected in 
2006. These moves took the price way below the Central issue price, substantially increasing 
the subsidy born by the state.33 The food subsidies were particularly important in 2008/9 
when food price inflation was high. Rs.1/- per kg rice when the open market price was 
Rs.14/- per kg or so for the poorest quality was a real boon to the poor.34  
Another initiative of the DMK government elected in 2006 was the distribution of 
free colour TVs to individual households. In 1996, TVs had been distributed to Dalit 
colonies only. Almost all Dalit households and a large number of non-Dalit households in 
the villages had free ‘Karunanidhi TVs’35 in 2008/9.    
There had been further improvements in Dalit housing by 2008/9. The new colonies 
being planned in 1996 were up and running, one Chakkiliyar, one Pannadi. Pannadis had 
also got an extension of their old colony. Significant numbers of Pannadis had bought houses 
in the main village as well. This was something that would have been unthinkable for 
Chakkiliyars. One of the reasons for Pannadis being in a stronger position here was that they 
were regarded as having higher status than Chakkiliyars. Another reason was that Pannadis 
all lived in a single village/hamlet from which relatively large numbers of Gounders had left. 
There were no Chakkiliyars living in that village/hamlet. One of the villages in which 
Chakkiliyars had got a new colony earlier, in 1981/2, had added another colony by 2008/9. 
Efforts were being made to get more house sites on another piece of land there too. There 
still seemed to be an insatiable demand for Dalit house sites. Some of this was a demand for 
the future for children. Most was simply to get away from multiple occupancy and crowding, 
still quite widespread in 2008/9. 
Participation in education had continued to increase. All Dalit (and non-Dalit) 
children under 15 were in school in 2008/9.36 There was very little child labour in the 
villages any more. This reflected a major change in attitudes to children and children’s 
education. Children were now the focus of attention, and seen as investments in the future, 
in labourer as well as other households. This was a far cry from 1981/2, and even 1996.  
In 2008/9 all state provided credit was being channelled through SHGs, as in many 
other parts of India. The SHGs in the study villages had not proved at all effective though. 
There was a spurt of activity in 2000/01 when the first were set up, but this soon petered 
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out. More support would be needed if SHGs were to generate finance for self-employment et 
al.37  
A limited amount of employment was being provided by the NREGS in 2008/9. 
This was an initiative on an altogether different scale from the employment generation 
schemes of the 1980s and the 1990s. The NREGS guaranteed up to 100 days of work per 
rural household per year in theory, for all who claimed it. The NREGS was started in 
selected districts in 2006, and extended to all rural areas in the country, including the study 
villages, in 2008/9.  
The scheme was only attractive to women in the study villages.38 Men’s wages for 
agricultural and other manual labour were much higher than those of women, and much 
higher than those being paid by the NREGS. There was little demand for NREGS work in 
the villages at first. But the demand gradually picked up. In 2011 it was attracting significant 
numbers from all Dalit colonies.39 There was also some non-Dalit uptake in 2011.40 It was 
still the case that only a minority of Dalit women were involved though, and many for far 
less than the maximum 100 days per year.  
Agricultural employers regarded the NREGS as another assault on agriculture which 
was already short of labour at a time when agriculture was getting little support from the 
state. While the wage of Rs.80/ -per day was on a par with what they were paying women for 
agricultural labour prior to 2010, when the wage went up on 1 January 2010 to Rs.100/-, 
they raised what they were paying to Rs.100/- too.41 Industrial employers also complained 
about the NREGS. Agricultural employers were putting some pressure on NREGS 
supervisors to try to get them to organise less NREGS work particularly in peak seasons. 
Pressure may also have been exerted at higher levels. This was not something that this 
research inquired into though.  
Thus there had been a significant further expansion of state social policy reaching 
both Dalit and non-Dalit low income households, strengthening their overall position, by 
2008/9. It had reinforced the impact of further integration into a fast-growing local 
industrial economy too.  
Employers complained more than ever about the difficulty of getting people to work 
in agriculture, attributing these to state social policy as well as to ‘Tiruppur’. Dalit labourers, 
on the other hand, were now talking about not having to work as much, or as hard, because 
of the PDS et al. The NREGS was an added bonus as far as labourers were concerned, 
increasing the wages of Dalit female agricultural labourers particularly. The combination of 
social policy with the continuing expansion of the industrial sector was continuing to shift 
the balance in favour of labour, both Dalit and non-Dalit. There were powerful interactions 
here.  
 
 
4.  Discussion  
The paper has focused on the evolution of employment, and of terms and conditions 
of employment in agriculture, and the evolution of social policy, over the period from 
1981/2 to 1996, and 1996 to 2008/9. The combination of increased employment 
opportunities in the growing industrial economy, albeit less for Dalits than for non-Dalits, 
and the expansion of social welfare programmes et al., led both to an increase in the 
wellbeing of labourers and their families, and to a strengthening of the bargaining position of 
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labour vis a vis employers. It was the association of strong, decentralised and labour-intensive 
industrial growth in the local economy with the expansion of social policy and social welfare 
that produced these results.  
We consider a number of issues that arise from these findings: first, issues relating to 
the tightening of the labour market; second, issues relating to the division of responsibility 
for the welbeing of labour between employers on the one hand, and the state on the other.   
 
 
(i)  THE TIGHTENING OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
One of the more striking features of the period under review was the tightening of 
the labour market.42 This was a regional phenomenon as far as the villages were concerned. 
Thus though there was no longer enough work in agriculture in the villages themselves, 
agriculturalists had difficulty attracting sufficient labour because there was enough work in 
the region as a whole, and this was work to which labourers in the villages also had access. 
The corollary of this was that to get enough labour agriculturalists had to treat labour well.  
The shortage of labour in agriculture was connected with the shortage of labour outside 
agriculture. Thus, although Dalits remained heavily involved in agricultural labour and less 
involved than non-Dalits in non-agricultural labour, the general shortage of labour spilled 
over from outside agriculture to agriculture. 
Although relatively few Dalit and non-Dalit women were employed outside 
agriculture, and employment available to them outside agriculture was much less attractive 
than that available to men, the fact that more were staying at home, relying more heavily on 
income brought in by men, meant that female labour was in particularly short supply as far 
as agriculture was concerned.  
The tightening of the labour market, and the reasons for the tightening of the labour 
market, differed in different segments of the labour market here. They were the product of 
longer-term processes affecting both the supply of labour and the demand, both overall, and 
segment by segment.  
The increase in the overall demand for labour in this case was dominated by the 
growth of the knitwear industry and all the subsidiary activities associated with this. Other 
textiles, particularly spinning and weaving, engineering, and metalworking contributed too. 
The growth of employment in the knitwear industry centred on Tiruppur outweighed all of 
these others though. Tiruppur has acted as a magnet drawing labour from all over Tamil 
Nadu, from where the majority of Tiruppur’s migrant labourers come. It has been drawing 
increasingly on labour from other states recently as well. This may in part be in order to get 
more docile labour. It was discussed primarily however in terms of an increasing shortage of 
labour from nearer by.  
While the shortage of labour in the region was driven primarily by demand, 
reductions in supply made their contribution to the tightening of the labour market as well.  
The labour supply had been affected by such things as the longer-term effects of fertility 
decline on the growth of the labour force, increasing participation in education reducing the 
number of young people in the labour force,43 and increases in wages and earnings making it 
less necessary for members of labourer households to put in as much work as before. This 
latter was countered only to some extent by increasing aspirations providing incentives to put 
in more.  
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Social policy and the expansion of social welfare made a strong contribution to the 
decrease in the labour supply. The PDS, the ICDS, school meals, maternity benefits, 
accident benefits, pensions, et al. made it possible for people to meet their consumption 
needs with less labour. This became clear in discussions with members of Dalit labourer 
households in the villages in 2008/9 in which men said that the Rs.1/- per kg rice made it 
possible to feed their families with 2-3 days work a week, instead of 5-6. It also made it 
possible for women to spend more time at home and less time doing paid work. These 
‘negative’ incentive effects should be regarded as improvements in a context in which poverty 
and under-nourishment have hitherto been associated with long hours and low pay.44 
Increased aspirations, reflected in increased spending on housing, and increased 
spending on children, in labourer households have not been strong enough to outweigh the 
incentives to supply less labour. There was a striking change between 1981/2 when very little 
was spent on children, and children brought in earnings from an early age, on the one hand, 
and 1996 and 2008/9 when households were having to do without children’s contributions 
to earnings and were involved in substantial additional expenditure associated with the 
improved standing of children within the household as well, on the other.45 Significant 
reductions in the supply of the labour of children, and of women looking after children, were 
being offset only to some extent by increased incentives to put in more labour to support 
new demands on household budgets. 
There were contradictory tendencies here. The net effect was to reduce the supply of 
labour over time, however. This could be seen in the reduction in numbers of young people 
in the labour force, the reduction in numbers of women in the labour force, even with their 
participation in the NREGS, and the reduction in numbers of days of paid work that men 
were putting in too.  
It should also be noted here that social welfare interventions dampened the increase 
in wages and earnings, by keeping the costs of living down, and by providing some of the 
things like pensions, maternity benefits, housing, et al. that one would normally expect 
employers to provide.  
 
 
(ii)  THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND THE 
STATE 
This paper has focused on the interplay between terms and conditions of 
employment on the one hand, and social policy on the other. This leads to questions 
concerning the division of responsibility for providing for labour between employers and the 
state. 
One can focus on employer responsibilities – not wanting to let employers off the 
hook. An alternative is to focus on what the state can do. The policy emphasis in India in the 
recent period, and in neo-liberal regimes generally, has been on reducing the responsibility of 
employers for providing fully for labour. Policies reducing the restrictions on employers, and 
reducing the obligations of employers, with respect to labour, have been accompanied by an 
expansion of state social policy, increasing the responsibility of the state.    
One of the questions that arises in connection with the state taking on more 
responsibility for providing for labour is its capacity to do so. There are many states in India 
that are poorly equipped to intervene effectively here. Tamil Nadu has a better record than 
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most states in India on this count. Not all states have the capacity to deliver on the scale that 
the Tamil Nadu state has done.  
There is also the question of the financing of state provision. The state may take 
responsibility for some of the provision for labour and finance it from taxes on employers – 
effectively making employers pay through another route. An alternative is to finance it 
through things like VAT, taxes on alcohol etc. The Tamil Nadu state appears to have done 
the latter,46 making it look as though labour is benefiting, masking the extent to which it is 
effectively paying for these benefits as well.  
Another relevant question in the Tamil Nadu case is whether state provision is being 
successful at too high a cost. The prime example here is the PDS. A good deal of the official 
Food and Consumer Protection Policy Note 2010/11 on the PDS (Government of Tamil 
Nadu, 2010a) is taken up with accounts of controls designed to reduce inefficiencies and 
limit the potential for corruption. There are undoubtedly inefficiencies in the system, though 
Swaminathan (2000) argues that for a programme of this kind these are not large. There is 
also widespread corruption.47 This may have to be accepted as necessary in a system that is 
providing a safety net for the poor. It is a serious question though, particularly if the poor are 
also paying a large part of the cost. 
This brings us to the bargaining power of labour. Trade unions which were powerful 
in the region in the 1960s and 1970s declined as industry became more fragmented and 
relied more on casual and migrant labour.48 Agricultural labour was never unionised in this 
area. Collective bargaining was generally rather weak in the industries that were important in 
the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. There is also the question of the bargaining power of 
labour vis a vis the state – the ability of labour to mobilise around state benefits et al. Party 
politics has played an important role in getting social policies introduced, and implemented. 
Populist politics in Tamil Nadu are usually regarded as responsible for the fact that Tamil 
Nadu was the first to introduce many social welfare policies that have now been adopted at 
the national level in India. Organised labour has not played a strong role here. There may be 
more to be gained by mobilising outside the workplace to put pressure on the state to deliver 
better on its social welfare policy though. This is an area in which labour mobilisation outside 
the workplace could play a role, through political parties, social movements, et al.49  
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
The paper has shown how terms and conditions of employment changed between 
1981/2 and 1996, and between 1996 and 2008/9, as the rural areas became more closely 
integrated into the growing industrial economy. Terms and conditions of employment in 
agriculture were harsh and oppressive in 1981/2 when a large majority of the population in 
the villages was working in agriculture. By 1996, the proportion working in agriculture had 
fallen, and terms and conditions of employment in agriculture had improved. The majority 
of labourers working outside agriculture were working on terms and conditions that were not 
very different from those in agriculture too. In 2008/9, there had been a further decrease in 
numbers working in agriculture, though much smaller than between 1981/2 and 1996. 
Terms and conditions of employment in agriculture had improved again, on a par with those 
in non-agricultural employment.  
   
 106
The paper has also shown how state social welfare policy developed over this period 
from playing a very limited role in 1981/2, to a significant role in 1996, and a very much 
expanded role in 2008/9. By 2008/9 it was clear that it was making a major contribution to 
labourers’ standards of living, something that it had not been doing either in 1996, or in 
1981/2.  
Improved terms and conditions of employment and expanded state social welfare  
policy had combined to produce very substantially improved standards of living for the 
labourer population between 1981/2 and 2008/9. It is only in comparison with what were 
very poor standards in 1981/2 that this looks impressive though. Labourers were still 
working hard for long hours for low pay in 2008/9. There were still very few opportunities 
to move into employment other than low skilled manual labour. State social policies may 
have improved the conditions of manual labourers, but they were not equipping many to 
move out of manual labour. These were policies supporting an economy relying on large 
quantities of relatively unskilled labour still. 
This raises questions about the strategy based on ‘cheap labour’ that the Indian state 
has been pursuing in the recent period, a strategy in which the responsibility for capitalist 
enterprises to provide fully for labour is reduced, and the state takes on more of this 
responsibility, the state pursuing a strategy of increasingly unequal development while 
providing safety nets to cater for the poor. An alternative is for the state to focus on 
increasing the skills and productivity of labour as a basis for enabling capitalist enterprises to 
compete in the world economy. If the state moved towards getting employers to pay the full 
cost of providing for labour, employers would have greater incentives to contribute to 
increasing the productivity of labour too. Increasing the skills and productivity of labour 
would enable employers to take responsibility for providing fully for labour and still remain 
competitive. It would enable labour to earn higher incomes as well. A strategy of the state 
promoting development that takes care of inequality in this way has much more to 
recommend it in the longer term than the strategy that is being pursued in India now.  
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NOTES 
 
1.  See Barrientos and Hulme (2008) for examples of other developing countries that also did 
so. 
 
2.  See Vijayabaskar (2011) on this too.  
 
3.  Other examples include Harriss-White and Janakarajan (2004), Breman (2007), Harriss 
et al. (2010), Rodgers and Rodgers (2011).  
 
4.  Baker (1984), Chari (2004), and Damodaran (2008). 
 
5.  Chari (2004). 
 
6.  The study villages comprise 6 hamlets in 2 revenue villages 40-60 km from Coimbatore 
and 25-30 km from Tiruppur. Members of a random sample of 20 percent of the 
households in these villages were interviewed between August 1981 and March 1982, a 
sample of 230 households in all. Sample interviews and discussions were supplemented by 
in-depth interviews with people outside the sample as well.   
 
7.  Thottam farmers were farmers with enough well irrigated land to support the 
employment of permanent labour in 1981/2. 
 
8.  These were 501 Chettiars, not to be confused with Devanga Chettiars, a weaver caste, 
represented only in small numbers in the villages in 1981/2. 501 Chettiars are Tamil-
speaking; Devanga Chettiars speak Telugu. 
 
9.  Chakkiliyars, were leatherworkers, also known as Madaris, or Arunthathiyars. Pannadis 
were Pallars, also known as Devendras. There were no Paraiyars, the other large Dalit group 
in Tamil Nadu. 
 
10.  1996 data come from a May-June re-survey of the 85 percent of the 1981/2 sample 
households that still had descendants living in the villages. Some information about those 
who had left was also obtained. 1996 sample interviews and discussions were supplemented 
by interviews with people outside the sample again too.   
 
11.  This was true in large parts of India. See Government of India (2007) for example on 
this. See Government of India (2005) on Tamil Nadu too.   
 
12.  Selective interviews were conducted in May 2003 and August 2004. In 2008/9, 
members of a new 20percent sample of households in the hamlets and revenue villages 
surveyed earlier were interviewed as part of a larger project on the impact of the Tiruppur 
knitwear industry on the region. Sample interviews and discussions were supplemented by 
selective in-depth interviews again.    
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13.  The Census data show that the population remained more or less unchanged between 
1991 and 2001. School Census data show that this remained the case between 2001 and 
2008 too.  
 
14.  See Heyer (forthcoming 2012).  
 
15.  Pannayals, or bonded labourers, were labourers employed on an annual basis, with an 
advance at the beginning of the year. See De Neve and Carswell (2011) for more detail on 
this. 
 
16.  This paper focuses on male employment. Female employment is dealt with elsewhere 
(Heyer, 2011). 
 
17.  Cederlof (1997)’s account of relationships between Gounders and Chakkiliyars in the 
1930s and 1940s resonates with relationships still prevailing in the villages in 1981/2. See 
Breman (1974) for an account of similar types of relationships in Gujerat too. Heyer (2000) 
has more detail on this too. 
 
18.  The annual rate of pay for pannayals in 1981/2 was Rs.2400/- for an adult doing the 
full range of tasks, with or without one or more meals per day. This was equivalent to the 
highest daily casual labour wage of Rs.7/- for 343 days of the year without taking account of 
any of the additional perks available to pannayals. Male wages for casual labour in 1981/2 
were Rs.5/-, Rs.6/- and Rs.7/-.  
 
19.  In 1996, adult pannayals doing the full range of tasks were paid Rs.10-11,000/- p.a. 
This represents an up to 100 percent increase using the Coimbatore rural rice price, and up 
to 90 percent using the CPIAL. (The India Labour Journal is the source both for the rice 
price and for the CPIAL.) This overstates the real rise though. There are a number of items 
of increased expenditure that are not included in the CPIAL, things like health care et al. 
Many new items were now regarded as necessities which they certainly were not before.   
 
20.  Daily agricultural wages for men were Rs. 5/-, Rs.6/- and Rs.7/- in 1981/2. In 1996 
they were Rs. 40/-, Rs. 45/-, Rs. 50/-. This represents an up to 200 percent increase using 
the Coimbatore rural rice price, and up to 175 percent using the CPIAL.   
 
21.  cf. Venkatsubramaniam (2006). 
 
22.  See Harriss-White (2004a) for more detailed information on this in north eastern Tamil 
Nadu villages in 1993/4. 
 
23.  cf. Kajisa and Palanichamy (2010). 
 
24.  See Heyer (2010a).  
 
25.  See Harriss-White (2004b) on this too. 
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26.  See Swaminathan (1990) for example on the IRDP. 
 
27.  State officials involved in implementing social policy programmes were now dealing 
with Dalits directly. Dalits were also going to the police to seek redress in disputes with non-
Dalits. Dalits were getting the tahsildar and other officials involved on their behalf in cases 
involving their burial grounds too. 
 
28.  See De Neve (2010) for more on employment in export units. 
 
29.  See Heyer (2010b) for more details of this. 
 
30.  A Muthuraja, a member of a low-caste group ranking just above Dalits in the caste 
hierarchy, from one of the study villages who was working in a knitwear unit commented 
that agricultural employers were having such difficulty getting labour in 2008/9 that 
agriculture was now paying better than the knitwear industry.  
 
31.  See De Neve and Carswell (2011) on this too. 
 
32.  Tur dhall, urid (sic) dhall, palmolein oil, and more wheat products were added in May 
2007. 
 
33.  The Central Government issues food for public distribution to the states at subsidised 
prices, and states like Tamil Nadu provide additional subsidies of their own. Since 1997 the 
Centre has provided greater subsidies for households that are below the poverty line (BPL 
households) than for households that are above (APL households). Tamil Nadu is one of the 
states that has continued with universal provision making no distinction either with respect 
to prices or with respect to quantities to which BPL and APL households are entitled. Tamil 
Nadu does make a distinction for AAY (Antyodaya Anna Yojana) households though, giving 
them greater entitlements than others. AAY is a Central scheme that was started in 2001 for 
the bottom 5percent. It was extended in 2004 to widows, destitute people, et al.   
 
34.  There were complaints about the quality of PDS rice but it was used extensively in Dalit 
households nearly all of whom obtained the maximum to which they were entitled. Khera 
(2011) suggests that there has been a revitalisation of the PDS elsewhere in India too. 
 
35.  After Karunanidhi, the Chief Minister of the state at the time. 
 
36.  This is mirrored in the state as a whole. Tamil Nadu has seen enormous advances since 
the early 1980s. It is within reach of achieving universal secondary education now (Kajis a 
and Palanichamy, 2010). 
 
37.  See Kalpana (2005) for a discussion of the issues here. SHGs have been more successful 
in some other parts of Tamil Nadu than in the villages on which this paper focuses. Kalpana 
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(2011) shows that their ‘success’ has not all been associated with increased self-employment 
though.   
 
38.  83 percent of beneficiaries in Tamil Nadu were women in 2009/10 (Government of 
India, 2010).  
 
39.  See Jeyaranjan (2011) for an account from villages in another part of Tamil Nadu in 
which an unpromising start was followed by adjustments that made the scheme more 
attractive after the first year or so.   
 
40.  The uptake of the NREGS has been very substantial inTamil Nadu to date 
(Government of India, 2010). Tamil Nadu had the 5th largest uptake in 2009/10, after 
Rajasthan, Andhra, UP and MP, when. 4.4 million households in Tamil Nadu were 
provided with a total of 239 million days of work (Government of India, 2010b). The 
number of days of work nearly doubled in Tamil Nadu between 2008/9 and 2009/10. It 
increased again in 2010/11 too.  
 
41.  Ravallion (1991) suggests that this was one of the main benefits of the Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme earlier too. Similar comments are being made on the 
NREGS now (Rajshekhar, 2011).  
 
42.  The increasing shortage of labour was being recorded elsewhere in Tamil Nadu too, not 
just in the Coimbatore/Tiruppur region (see Harriss et al. [2010] for example).    
 
43.  This has been an all-India phenomenon as well.  
 
44.  See Heyer (2011) for more on this, particularly where women are concerned. Jeyaranjan 
(2011) discusses this too. 
 
45.  Very few labourer households in these villages sent their children to private schools, and 
the majority were benefiting from free school uniforms and books, but they were incurring 
additional expenditure on clothes et al., and on providing a good enough diet in addition to 
what children got at school. 
 
46.  It is possible to see this by looking at figures reproduced in Government of India 
(2005), and Government of Tamil Nadu (2010b). Budget categories do not make it very 
easy to do this though. See also Vijayabaskar (2011).    
 
47.  Transparency International’s India Corruption Study ranked 5 states alarming, 3 states 
very high, 7 states high, 7 states moderate for corruption with respect to the poor and  
specifically the PDS (Transparency International, 2005). Tamil Nadu was one of the 3 states 
in the ‘very high’ category. 
 
48.  See Chari (2004).  
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49.  See Vijayabaskar (2011) on this too. 
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Table 1.  Sample population by caste, 1981/2, 1996 and 2008/9 (numbers and row percentages) 
          
  Chakkiliyars* Pannadis Dalits Naidus Gounders Chettiars Others 
Non-
Dalits All 
1981/2    no. 201 177 378 55 399 171 177 802 1180 
            (%)   (17) (15) (32) (5) (34) (14) (15) (68) (100) 
1996       no. 203 182 385 47 394 199 139 779 1164 
              (%)   (17) (16) (33) (4) (34) (17) (12) (67) (100) 
2008/9    no. 276 136 412 50 318 159 96 623 1035 
              (%)   (27) (13) (40) (5) (31) (15) (9) (60) (100) 
          
Source: Village Surveys         
* The numbers of Chakkiliyars were underestimated in 19812 and 1996. It remains the case that the 
proportion of Chakkiliyars in the population increased over the period nevertheless.  
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Table 2.   Male agricultural labour force by caste, 1981/2, 1996 and 2008/9 (numbers and column percentages) 
          
1981/2  Chakkiliyars Pannadis Dalits Naidus Gounders Chettiars Others 
Non-
Dalits All 
Casual        no. 47 43 90 1 21 10 9 41 131 
(%)  (59) (70) (64) (50) (91) (63) (82) (79) (68) 
Pannayal    no. 30 3 33  1  1 2 35 
(%)  (38) (5) (23)  (4)  (9) (4) (18) 
SCC**        no. 3 15 18 1 1 6 1 9 27 
(%)  (4) (25) (13) (50) (4) (38) (9) (17) (14) 
All               no. 80 61 141 2 23 16 11 52 193 
(%)  (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 100 
          
          
1996 Chakkiliyars Pannadis Dalits Naidus Gounders Chettiars Others 
Non-
Dalits All 
Casual        no. 39 11 50  14 2 7 23 73 
(%)  (64) (30) (51)  (100) (67) (100) (96) (60) 
Pannayal    no. 20 2 22      22 
(%)  (33) (5) (22)      (18) 
SCC**        no. 2 24 26   1  1 27 
(%)  (3) (65) (27)     (33)   (4) (22) 
All               no. 61 37 98   14 3 7 24 122 
(%)  (100) (100) (100)   (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
          
          
2008/9 Chakkiliyars Pannadis Dalits Naidus Gounders Chettiars Others 
Non-
Dalits All 
Casual        no. 71 23 94  6 8 4 18 112 
(%)  (99) (100) (99)  (100) (100) (100) (100) (99) 
Pannayal    no. 1  1      1 
(%)  (1)  (1)      (1) 
SCC**        no.          
(%)                    
All               no. 72 23 95   6 8 4 18 113 
(%)  (100) (100) (100)   (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
          
* casual and contract labour ** sugar cane crushers     
Source: Village Surveys 
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Table 3.  Male paid non-agricultural employment by caste, 1981/2, 1996 and 2008/9 (numbers)  
          
1981/2       no. Chakkiliyars Pannadis Dalits Naidus Gounders Chettiars Others 
Non-
Dalits All 
Knitwear factories    7   7 7 
Textile mills    2 3 1 1 7 7 
Powerlooms          
Workshops     1 1  2 2 
misc factories       1 1   2 4 4 
Trade & services         4 2 5 11 11 
Govt.employment 2 1 3 1 7 6 6 21 21 
misc salaried                   
All non-agric. 2 1 3 4 23 10 15 52 55 
          
          
          
1996          no. Chakkiliyars Pannadis Dalits Naidus Gounders Chettiars Others 
Non-
Dalits All 
Knitwear 
factories 4 2 6  21 6 6 33 39 
Textile mills 1 4 5 2 4 4 5 15 20 
Powerlooms 4 2 6    1 1 7 
Workshops  4 4 2 4 4 1 11 15 
misc factories         5 1   6 6 
Trade & services   8 8   1 1 4 6 14 
Govt.employment 2  2  3 4 2 9 11 
misc salaried                   
All non-agric. 11 20 31 4 38 20 19 81 112 
          
          
          
2008/9      no. Chakkiliyar Pannadi Dalits Naidu Gounder Chettiar Other 
Non-
Dalits All 
Knitwear 
factories 20 4 24  23 18 14 55 79 
Textile mills  2 2 1    1 3 
Powerlooms  6 6  2   2 8 
Workshops    1 1  1 3 3 
misc.factories 1   1     1   1 2 
Trade  services   2 2   13 3 9 25 27 
Govt.employment 1  1  1 4  5 6 
misc salaried         1 1   2 2 
All non-agric. 22 14 36 2 41 27 24 94 130 
Source: Village Surveys 
